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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of corporate valuation around
the world. Speciﬁcally, we (i) document and compare corporate valuation around the world, and (ii)
identify the key factors that drive cross-country diﬀerences in valuation. In doing so, we utilize the
country-level Tobin’s q (CTQ), computed as the ratio of the aggregate market value to book value of
all assets held by all public ﬁrms domiciled in a country, which amounts to the Tobin’s q for the
‘market portfolio’ of the country. The key ﬁndings of the paper are: First, CTQ varies greatly across
countries, ranging from 0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean of 1.30
during our sample period 1999–2004. Despite the steady integration of the world economy in recent
years, corporate valuation remains starkly diﬀerent across countries. Second, apart from the eﬀect of
corporate governance, cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation are signiﬁcantly driven by the
growth options of countries represented by the R&D intensities, capital expenditures, and GDP
growth. In addition, the degree of capital market openness has a signiﬁcant, independent eﬀect on
valuation. Third, our regression analyses show that CTQ varies directly with shareholder rights,
enforcement of insider trading laws, GDP growth, R&D intensity, and the degree of capital market
openness. The key ﬁndings remain robust to the inclusion of inﬂation and industry eﬀects.
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1. Introduction
A string of recent studies show that cross-country diﬀerences in legal and social infra-
structure systematically aﬀect corporate valuation around the world. La Porta et al.
(2002), (LLSV, hereafter) show that the ﬁrms domiciled in English common law countries,
where investors’ rights are relatively well protected, receive higher valuation than the ﬁrms
in French and German civil law countries where investor protection is relatively weak. Lee
and Ng (2003), document that there exists a signiﬁcant negative relationship between
country-level corruption and corporate valuation. In a similar vein, Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002) show that the enforcement of insider trading laws has a signiﬁcantly nega-
tive eﬀect on equity cost of capital. Defond and Hung (2004) likewise document that in
countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with
poor stock returns. Claessens et al. (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) further show how
the corporate governance–ownership interactions aﬀect ﬁrm value. Overall, these studies
indicate that eﬀective legal systems, clean governments, and transparent management
practices enhance corporate valuation as investors can expect to receive fair returns under
these environments.
The aforementioned studies are mostly concerned with establishing the value relevance
of a particular set of variables, i.e., corporate governance variables. Although these studies
provide rather robust evidence on the value relevance of the governance-related variables,
little is known about the relative importance of these variables in driving overall cross-
country diﬀerences in corporate valuation. Apart from governance factors, corporate val-
uation may be driven by a host of other critical factors, such as growth options, trade and
investment regimes, and corporate tax structure. In this paper, we purport to provide a
broad analysis of cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation based on a wide range
of factors. Speciﬁcally, we (i) document and compare corporate valuation around the
world using a sample of 49 countries and (ii) identify the key factors that account for
cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation. In spite of the steady integration of the
world economy in recent decades, corporate valuation remains starkly diﬀerent across
countries. Our ﬁndings in this paper will help us better understand why corporate valua-
tion systematically varies across countries.
Like many previous studies, we use Tobin’s q as a measure of corporate valuation.
Since we are mainly concerned with cross-country diﬀerences in valuation, we opt to
use the country-level aggregate Tobin’s q based on all exchange-listed ﬁrms domiciled
in each country. This ‘country Tobin’s q’ (CTQ, in short) is computed as the ratio of
the aggregate market value to book value of assets of all exchange-listed ﬁrms domiciled
in a country. As such, CTQ represents the Tobin’s q for the entire ‘market portfolio’ of the
country.1
As mentioned previously, there can be other critical factors that are value-relevant,
apart from governance factors. Finland has a CTQ of 2.11, substantially surpassing the
CTQ of the United States of 1.79. Since the United States has a corporate governance
1 We conduct our analysis at the country level for two reasons. First, we are interested in the valuation
diﬀerences at the country level. Thus, the Tobin’s q measured at the aggregate market portfolio level represents a
natural choice. By deﬁnition, the market portfolio covers the entire market. Second, an analysis conducted at the
ﬁrm level is likely to be dominated by small ﬁrms. Consequently, the results derived primarily from small ﬁrms
may not be representative of the whole market.
36 C.T. Chua et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (2007) 35–56
regime that is generally viewed as at least as eﬀective as that of Finland, such a high
Tobin’s q for Finland suggests that there are likely to be additional factors driving
cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation. At the same time, Norway, a country that
shares with Finland similar legal and corporate governance environments, has a CTQ of
1.22, which is almost half that of Finland’s. The inter-country diﬀerences in the aggregate
Tobin’s q among Finland, Norway, and the United States mentioned above may reﬂect, in
part, the diﬀerences in future growth options that these countries face. For instance, Fin-
land has a much higher ratio (3.37%) of R&D expenditure to GDP than Norway (1.64%)
or the United States (2.69%) during our sample period. The ‘Finland premium’ thus may
reﬂect the capitalization of a strong growth potential of the country perceived by capital
markets. In the same vein, countries like Sweden and Switzerland (a country with German
civil law tradition) enjoy high CTQ scores, 1.66 and 1.89, respectively, mainly due to their
strong growth potentials.
Corporate valuation may also be aﬀected by the degree of economic openness. For
example, ﬁrms operating in countries with restricted capital markets, such as Brazil, Chile,
Israel, and Malaysia, may receive lower valuation as their restricted capital market regimes
discourage international investments and hamper eﬃcient risk sharing. Open capital mar-
kets would promote a more eﬃcient risk sharing among international investors, which
results in lower costs of capital and higher corporate valuation. Previous studies, e.g.,
Henry (2000), support this view. Similarly, free trade may also enhance corporate valua-
tion as it induces ﬁrms to specialize in the product areas where they possess comparative
advantages and core competence and pursue proﬁts in global markets, instead of conﬁning
themselves to local markets. For example, the Netherlands, has one of the highest CTQ
(1.71), possibly reﬂecting, at least in part, the highly open and multinational nature of
the Dutch economy.
The key empirical ﬁndings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, country
Tobin’s q (CTQ) varies greatly across countries. The six-year average CTQ ranges from
0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean of 1.30 during our
sample period 1999–2004. Countries with the English common law tradition have an aver-
age CTQ of 1.38, whereas those with the French civil law tradition have a lower average
CTQ, 1.22. German civil law countries have an average CTQ of 1.33, comparable to that
for English common law countries. Scandinavian civil law countries have the highest CTQ,
1.66, on average, whereas countries with the socialist origin have the lowest average CTQ,
1.06. CTQ varies substantially not only across legal families but also within a particular
legal family. Among German civil law countries, for example, CTQ ranges from 0.97
for Korea to 1.89 for Switzerland. This suggests that corporate valuation is likely to be
aﬀected by legal as well as extra-legal factors.
Second, over and above the eﬀects of corporate governance, cross-country diﬀerences in
corporate valuation are also signiﬁcantly driven by the growth options of countries mea-
sured by such proxies as the ratio of aggregate R&D expenditure to GDP and the ratio of
capital expenditures to GDP. In particular, the R&D intensity variable alone can explain
about 23% of international diﬀerences in CTQ. Our analyses suggest that growth options
are key drivers of CTQ though they have slightly lower explanatory power than corporate
governance. In addition, capital market openness has a signiﬁcant, independent eﬀect on
corporate valuation: the more open capital markets are, the higher is corporate valuation,
ceteris paribus. Liberalized capital markets may enhance corporate valuation by promot-
ing eﬃcient risk sharing, which results in reduced costs of capital and more proﬁtable
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corporate investments. Trade openness, however, is found to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
on CTQ.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst reviews the valuation model
to frame our discussion and presents the aggregate Tobin’s q for a cross-section of coun-
tries. Section 3 discusses international diﬀerences in corporate valuation focusing on the
eﬀects of corporate governance, growth options, economic openness, and tax regime. Sec-
tion 4 provides regression analyses of cross-country corporate valuation and discusses the
empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Corporate valuation and country Tobin’s q
In this section, we (i) use the discounted cash ﬂow valuation model to frame our discus-
sion of corporate valuation, and (ii) compute and compare the aggregate Tobin’s q for a
cross-section of sample countries.
2.1. Corporate valuation: A brief review
As is well known, the value of a levered ﬁrm (VL) can be expressed as the sum of the
value of an otherwise similar unlevered ﬁrm (VU) and the value of tax shields (VTS)
3:
V L ¼ V U þ V TS: ð1Þ
The value of an unlevered ﬁrm (VU), in turn, can be written as the sum of the value of
assets in place and the value of growth options:
V U ¼ EBIT1ð1 T CÞRU þ
X1
t¼1
I t½rtð1 T CÞ  RU
RUð1þ RUÞt
; ð2Þ
where EBIT1 denotes the ﬁrm’s earnings before interest and taxes at the end of the ﬁrst
period, RU denotes the unlevered cost of equity capital, and TC denotes the corporate in-
come tax rate. It is the new investment made at time t on top of the replacement invest-
ments. The replacement investments are assumed to be equal to the depreciation, which
is required to maintain the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows at a constant level, while the new investments
are needed to fulﬁll the growth opportunities that the ﬁrm possesses. The expected return
on the new investment (It) is denoted by rt. The ﬁrst term in the right hand side (RHS) of
Eq. (2) captures the value of assets in place, which is the present value of cash ﬂows to the
ﬁrm when the ﬁrm has no growth. The second term in the RHS of Eq. (2) represents the
value of growth options.
2 One may argue that companies in the developed and developing market are intrinsically diﬀerent and their
valuations could be aﬀected by diﬀerent factors. Among other things, they may have diﬀerent exposure to their
respective country’s legal environment and as a result the ﬁndings in our paper may apply to one but not the
other. To examine if our key results hold in both sets of countries, we run random-eﬀects regressions for
developed countries and developing countries separately. Our key results stand. The variables related to corporate
governance, growth option and economic openness are found to be signiﬁcant in both sets of countries. However,
high ownership concentration is found to be more detrimental to valuation in developed countries than in
developing countries with high anti-director rights.
3 For a standard discussion of the valuation model, please refer to chapters 13–15 in Copeland and Weston
(1992). For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider bankruptcy costs and personal taxes here.
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The accounting of tax shields has been extensively debated in the literature. In a recent
paper, Fernandez (2004) compares diﬀerent approaches and shows that the value of tax
shields is equivalent to the diﬀerence between the present values of two streams of cash
ﬂows: taxes paid by an unlevered company and those by an otherwise similar levered ﬁrm.
He shows that for a zero growth ﬁrm, the value of tax shield is DTC, where D is the
amount of debt outstanding. For a constant growing ﬁrm, on the other hand, the value
of tax shields is equal to
V TS ¼ DT C RUðRU  gÞ
 
; ð3Þ
where g is the constant growth rate of the ﬁrm. Combining Eqs. (2) and (3), we can rewrite
the ﬁrm value Eq. (1) as follows:
V L ¼ EBIT1ð1 T CÞRU þ
X1
t¼1
I t½rtð1 T CÞ  RU
RUð1þ RUÞt
þ DT C RUðRU  gÞ
 
¼ Value of assets in placeþ Value of growth options
þ Value of tax shields: ð4Þ
Eq. (4) provides a useful analytical framework within which we can compare the valuation
of ﬁrms across countries. Corporate tax rates, TC, aﬀect each of the three components of
the ﬁrm value, indicating that diﬀerential corporate tax rates would result in diﬀerential
corporate valuation across countries, ceteris paribus. Also, Eq. (4) shows that to the extent
that the equity cost of capital, RU, varies across countries due to imperfect integration of
capital markets, corporate valuation would be systematically aﬀected by capital market
regime, open vs. closed. The cost of equity capital, RU, plays a role in each of the three
components of the valuation formula. Similarly, corporate governance system would also
aﬀect corporate valuation by inﬂuencing investors’ cash ﬂow rights. Eq. (4) also shows
that if countries face diﬀerent growth opportunities (i.e., new investment opportunities
with the expected after-tax returns exceeding the cost of capital), corporate valuation
may systematically vary across countries. Finally, the third term of Eq. (4) suggests
how diﬀerences in the capital structure among countries, together with corporate tax rates,
may systematically aﬀect cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation.
2.2. Tobin’s q around the world
To facilitate the comparison of corporate valuation across countries, we normalize Eq.
(4) by the book value of assets and use Tobin’s q as our valuation measure. Previous stud-
ies, e.g., LLSV (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Lemmon and Lins (2003), also used the
same measure. Instead of examining Tobin’s q at the individual ﬁrm level, however, we
examine it at the country level.
We include in our sample only those ﬁrms that are incorporated domestically and are
publicly listed and traded. We exclude banks and ﬁnancial ﬁrms (those with SIC code from
6000 to 6999) from consideration since valuation ratios for ﬁnancial ﬁrms are not compa-
rable to those for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We obtain the necessary ﬁrm-level accounting data
from Worldscope. Firms with the book value of assets, debt, or equity less than zero are
excluded from our sample. For a country to be included in our sample, it must have at
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least three ﬁrms satisfying the aforementioned criteria and with complete data between
1999 and 2004. This selection procedure leaves us a sample of 49 countries.
We estimate the country-level Tobin’s q, CTQ, as the ratio of the aggregate market
value to book value of assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country.
CTQ can thus be regarded as the Tobin’s q for the ‘market portfolio’ of the country.
The market value of assets is estimated as the sum of the market value of common and
preferred equities and book value of debts. The market value of equities is estimated at
the end of December. For book value, we use the data recorded at the ﬁscal year-end.
However, if a company’s ﬁscal year ends after February next year, we use the book value
recorded in the previous ﬁscal year-end. For each country, we calculate CTQ for 1999
through 2004.4
Table 1 provides the estimate of CTQ, averaged over 1999 through 2004, for each of 49
countries under study. The table also provides the market value of equities, book value of
debts, and book value of assets for each sample country. The number of sample ﬁrms
included ranges from 7 for Egypt to 5,218 for the United States, with the average being
430. As can be expected, the United States has the largest market value of equities
($11,763 billion), followed by Japan, ($2768 billion), the United Kingdom ($2050 billion),
France ($1044 billion), and Germany ($845 billion). The same ﬁve countries have the larg-
est book values of assets. The ratio of book value of debts to the market value of equities is
substantially higher for countries like Germany and Japan than for the US and the UK.
This reﬂects the historical dependence of the former countries on the banking sector for
ﬁnancing.
The last column of Table 1 presents CTQ for each country, while Fig. 1 provides the
same in ascending order to facilitate cross-country comparison. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, Finland has the highest CTQ (2.11) among all of our sample countries, followed
by the Switzerland (1.89), Luxembourg (1.80) and USA (1.79). In contrast, Venezuela,
Russia, Slovakia, and Colombia have the lowest CTQs, each less than 0.80. It is obvious
that corporate valuation varies greatly across countries. Speciﬁcally, CTQ ranges from
0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean (median) value of
1.30 (1.27). The world Tobin’s q (i.e., the Tobin’s q for the world market portfolio), which
is computed as the ratio of the sum of the aggregate market value of equities ($24.5 tril-
lion) and the book value of debts ($17.8 trillion) to the book value of all assets ($28.0 tril-
lion) held by all of our 21,055 individual sample ﬁrms, turns out to be 1.51. The world
Tobin’s q is substantially greater than the international average of CTQ due to the dom-
inant size of the US economy with a relatively high CTQ.
The summary statistics for CTQ by legal origin, presented in the bottom panel of Table
1, indicate that English common law countries, on average, receive higher corporate val-
uation than French civil law and German civil law countries, consistent with the ﬁnding of
LLSV (2002). Countries with the socialist origin on average receive the lowest valuation,
whereas the Scandinavian countries receive the highest valuation. CTQ varies substantially
within a legal family as well. Among English common law countries, CTQ ranges from
4 Our measure of Tobin’s q suﬀers from the same problem faced by others in the literature. Namely, due to the
practical diﬃculty, we use the book value as a proxy for the replacement cost of assets. It is diﬃcult to gauge the
extent of distortion by this imperfect measure of Tobin’s q. But the noise arising from this imperfect measure is
likely to work against us ﬁnding signiﬁcant results in our regression analyses unless the distortion creates a
systematic bias which correlates positively with one or more of our variables.
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Table 1
Country Tobin’s q around the world
Country N MV Equity ($B) BV Debt ($B) BV Assets ($B) Country Tobin’s Q
Argentina 64 38.0 29.4 56.2 1.20
Australia 892 341.1 157.9 301.5 1.65
Austria 75 28.0 40.9 61.6 1.12
Belgium 94 79.7 72.9 115.6 1.32
Brazil 241 165.5 167.6 314.0 1.06
Canada 972 580.6 368.1 651.9 1.46
Chile 135 55.9 45.3 99.5 1.02
China 767 342.8 168.0 382.8 1.33
Colombia 30 6.3 4.5 14.0 0.77
Czech Republic 36 12.1 11.1 26.8 0.86
Denmark 129 92.6 48.0 85.2 1.65
Egypt 7 4.9 3.7 6.2 1.40
Finland 125 218.9 86.4 145.0 2.11
France 651 1,044.3 1,041.4 1,494.2 1.40
Germany 650 845.0 1,176.8 1,588.3 1.27
Hong kong 583 335.9 165.8 383.9 1.31
Hungary 33 12.7 7.0 15.3 1.29
India 354 141.7 96.1 167.7 1.42
Indonesia 203 31.9 28.4 48.9 1.23
Ireland 60 45.4 26.9 45.5 1.59
Israel 97 52.9 47.4 71.9 1.40
Italy 196 422.4 519.8 739.9 1.27
Japan 3,341 2,768.4 3,400.5 5,068.0 1.22
Korea 666 222.5 412.1 656.2 0.97
Luxembourg 20 77.2 46.6 68.6 1.80
Malaysia 604 99.4 88.4 167.3 1.12
Mexico 103 138.3 111.9 206.3 1.21
Netherlands 165 647.0 385.5 602.1 1.71
New Zealand 89 25.2 16.8 32.3 1.30
Norway 139 71.8 73.3 118.5 1.22
Pakistan 92 10.9 9.1 15.7 1.27
Peru 75 8.3 6.9 15.1 1.01
Philippines 117 14.9 19.9 35.0 0.99
Poland 64 19.5 12.7 24.1 1.33
Portugal 55 42.9 49.0 73.0 1.26
Russia 30 84.2 55.2 183.4 0.76
Singapore 387 104.5 65.2 134.3 1.26
Slovakia 10 0.9 1.2 2.8 0.77
South Africa 314 93.3 50.4 102.8 1.40
Spain 119 296.2 248.1 390.3 1.39
Sri Lanka 16 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.88
Sweden 280 230.1 126.2 214.4 1.66
Switzerand 186 480.3 208.0 363.8 1.89
Taiwan 831 344.0 162.4 337.5 1.50
Thailand 304 50.7 47.7 77.5 1.27
UK 1,413 2,050.3 1,048.9 1,895.7 1.63
US 5,218 11,762.6 6,786.8 10,369.8 1.79
Venezuela 15 4.4 3.5 10.9 0.73
Zimbabwe 13 1.4 0.9 1.8 1.26
World 21,055 24,548.0 17,751.7 27,984.6 1.51
(continued on next page)
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0.88 for Sri Lanka to 1.79 for the US. Among French civil law countries, CTQ ranges from
0.73 for Venezuela to 1.80 for the Luxembourg. Among the Scandinavian countries, CTQ
ranges from 1.22 for Norway to 2.11 for Finland. Lastly, among German civil law coun-
tries, CTQ ranges from 0.97 for Korea to 1.89 for Switzerland. The substantial variation
of CTQ within each legal family suggests that besides legal origins, other factors may also
play important roles in driving corporate valuation around the world.
3. Determinants of country Tobin’s q
In this section, we discuss some of the key determinants of cross-country corporate val-
uation. Our focus is on corporate governance, growth options, economic openness, and
corporate tax regime.
3.1. Corporate governance
Consider two diﬀerent countries, say, the United States and Korea. In spite of the fact
that Korea has enjoyed a much higher rate of economic growth than the United States in
recent years, CTQ for the United States is 1.79 during our sample period, which is almost
twice as high as that for Korea, 0.97. However, when we take into account the fact that the
standards of corporate governance and law enforcement are substantially higher in the
United States than in Korea, it may not be surprising that US ﬁrms would be valued gen-
erally higher than Korean ﬁrms. This ‘Korea discount’, a well-known regularity amongst
investment professionals, is most likely a reﬂection of a weak corporate governance regime
dominated by chaebols and also the substantial political risk that the country faces.
As discussed earlier, LLSV (2002) and Lee and Ng (2003) document that investor
protection and country-level corruption indeed aﬀect corporate valuation. A less corrupt
Table 1 (continued)
Legal origin Summary statistics by legal origins
No. of countries Median Mean SD CV (%) Range
English common law 16 1.35 1.38 0.22 16.10 0.90
French civil law 17 1.23 1.22 0.29 23.31 1.07
German civil law 6 1.25 1.33 0.33 24.68 0.92
Scandinavian civil law 4 1.66 1.66 0.36 21.66 0.88
Socialist origin 6 1.08 1.06 0.29 27.16 0.57
Total 49 1.27 1.27 0.30 24.01 1.37
This table reports the country Tobin’s q, averaged over 1999–2004, for the 49 countries that we study. The
country Tobin’s q (CTQ) is estimated as the ratio of aggregate market value to book value of assets held by all
sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. The market value of assets is estimated as the sum of the market value
of common and preferred equities and book value of debt. The market value of equities is measured at the end of
December. For book value, we use the data recorded at the ﬁscal year end. However, if a company’s ﬁscal year
ends after February next year, we use the book value recorded in the previous ﬁscal year end instead. The market
value (MV) of equities and book value (BV) of debt and assets are reported in billions of dollars. The number of
sample ﬁrms (N) for each country is also reported in the table. All the reported numbers are the average over the
six-year sample period. Summary statistics of the country Tobin’s q by legal origins are reported at the bottom
part of the table. SD denotes the standard deviation. CV and range measure the dispersion of the country Tobin’s
q, where the former is the coeﬃcient of variation, equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean, and the
latter is the diﬀerence between the maximum and minimum values.
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government and an investor friendly legal system make it diﬃcult for corporate insiders
and bureaucrats to steal from investors. This increases the cash ﬂows to investors and
reduces their required returns. In the same spirit, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) inves-
tigate the relationship between the cost of capital and the enforcement of insider trading
law in diﬀerent countries. They ﬁnd that the aggregate cost of capital declines signiﬁcantly
after a country’s ﬁrst prosecution of insider trading law violation.
LLSV (1998, 1999) document a wide variation of corporate ownership structure across
diﬀerent countries. They show that ownership is, in general, more concentrated in those
countries where shareholder protection is relatively weak. In such countries, concentrated
ownership is a way of protecting shareholder rights, in lieu of legal protection. Since large
shareholders have a stronger incentive and power to monitor and discipline managers than
small, minority shareholders, concentrated ownership could serve as a remedy for agency
problem. Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003) and LLSV (2002) provide evi-
dence consistent with this argument. These studies collectively show that ﬁrm value
increases as the ownership of large shareholders increases. However, they also document
that ﬁrm value is inversely related to the ‘wedge’ between control and cash ﬂow rights of
large shareholders, indicating the entrenchment eﬀect of large shareholdings.
Fig. 1. Country Tobin’s q around the world. This ﬁgure ranks the average country Tobin’s q over the years 1999–
2004, in a descending order for the 49 countries that we study. The country Tobin’s q is estimated as the ratio of
aggregate market value to book value of assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. The market
value of assets is estimated as the sum of the market value of common and preferred equities and book value of
debt. The market value of equities is measured at the end of December. For book value, we use the data recorded
at the ﬁscal year end. However, if a company’s ﬁscal year ends after February next year, we use the book value
recorded in the previous ﬁscal year end instead.
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In summary, the evidence documented in the extant literature suggests the following
relationships: (i) stronger protection of shareholder rights should lead to a higher CTQ,
and (ii) when legal protection of shareholder rights is weak, a concentrated ownership
structure may serves as a remedy to agency problems, thereby enhancing ﬁrm value, so
long as the entrenchment eﬀect does not become dominant.
3.2. Growth options
Firms domiciled in diﬀerent countries may face substantially diﬀerent growth prospects,
resulting in international diﬀerences in corporate valuation. Apart from common legal tra-
dition, ﬁrms domiciled in the same country share the endowments of natural resources,
labor and human capital pool, and other tangible and intangible assets. Also, ﬁrms of a
country are aﬀected by the same monetary, ﬁscal, and trade policies. To a certain extent,
therefore, ﬁrms of a country may share country-speciﬁc growth options, aﬀecting CTQ of
the country. Divergent growth options faced by countries are manifested in often starkly
diﬀerent rates of economic growth. During the period 1999–2004, the Irish economy grew
rapidly, at the annual rate of 7% in real terms, whereas other EU member countries like
France and Germany grew at a much slower pace.
Growth options are inherently diﬃcult to measure. In this paper, we use the real rate of
GDP growth, ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP, and ratio of capital expenditures to
GDP to represent the growth options that a country possesses. To the extent that the cur-
rent pace of GDP growth predicts future economic growth, it would have a positive eﬀect
on CTQ. Also, a country’s overall R&D expenditures, private and public, may serve as a
proxy for its future growth options. Current R&D expenditures may pave the way for
long-term corporate investments and economic growth down the road. Furthermore, cap-
ital expenditures may also signal future growth options. Consistent with this argument,
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) document an increase (decrease) in the market value
of industrial ﬁrms when they announce an increase (decrease) in their capital expenditure
plans.
3.3. Economic openness
Previous studies, e.g., Alexander et al. (1987) and Henry (2000), suggest that the cost of
capital would decline when capital markets are liberalized, reﬂecting more eﬃcient risk
sharing. Lower costs of capital, in turn, would transform some investment projects previ-
ously with negative NPVs into positive NPV projects after liberalization. As shown by
Lang et al. (2003), international trading of stocks via cross-listings can also improve ﬁrms’
information environments (e.g., greater analyst coverage, increased forecasting accuracy,
etc.) and thereby enhances corporate valuation. As is well known, cross-listings are a pop-
ular method that companies use to make their stocks internationally tradable. Overall,
capital market openness may aﬀect corporate valuation through the cost of capital and
cash ﬂow eﬀects. It is thus reasonable to expect that capital market openness would have
a positive eﬀect on CTQ.
Open trade may also boost corporate valuation as it allows ﬁrms to specialize in the
product areas where they have comparative advantages and pursue proﬁts globally, rather
than locally. At the same time, ﬁrms can outsource inputs globally, reducing production
costs and thereby boosting proﬁts. In short, both global outsourcing and marketing can
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boost ﬁrms’ proﬁts. It is recognized, however, that ﬁrms operating in open global markets
are also exposed to foreign competition and their proﬁt margins can be squeezed as a
result of this competition. Thus, the eﬀect of trade openness on CTQ is an empirical issue.
3.4. Corporate tax regime
Tax shields, proxied by the leverage ratio multiplied by the corporate tax rate (D/
B · TC), and the corporate tax advantage, measured as (1  TC), should have positive
eﬀects on CTQ. As can be seen from Eq. (4), tax shields add to ﬁrm value. In principle,
interest payments are tax deductible in each of our sample countries. We thus expect
tax shields to have a positive eﬀect on CTQ. On the other hand, (1  TC) represents the
corporate tax advantage of residing and doing business in a given country. As such, it
is likely to have a positive eﬀect on CTQ. The corporate tax advantage, however, would
reduce the value of tax shields, thereby mitigating its contribution to corporate valuation.
We also recognize that the complicated tax codes in each country and the various methods
corporations can use to minimize their taxes, e.g., transfer pricing, may render the valua-
tion eﬀect of taxes weaker and also more diﬃcult to measure.
4. Regression analyses
In this section, we (i) examine the cross-country data on regression-related variables, (ii)
present the ﬁndings from regression analyses, and (iii) perform robustness checks of the
key ﬁndings.
4.1. The data
Table 2 presents the data on the variables to be used in our regression analyses. To con-
serve space, we present in Table 2 the variables, averaged over our sample period, 1999–
2004, whereas a panel of annual data for 49 countries spanning 1999 through 2004 is used
in the actual regression analysis. We obtain most of the necessary ﬁrm-level data, e.g.,
book value of assets, leverage, and capital expenditure, from Worldscope, and corporate
governance related data, e.g., legal origin, corporate ownership, and anti-director rights,
from La Porta et al. (1998). We obtain such country-level macroeconomic data as trade
openness measure, inﬂation, GDP growth, and R&D expenditure, from the various issues
of World Development Report published by the World Bank. In addition, we obtain the
capital market openness and ﬁnancial disclosure transparency measures for each country
from the Global Competitiveness Report. We further obtain the trans-nationality index
from World Investment Report published by the United Nations and use the corruption
perception index compiled by Transparency International.
A few things are noteworthy from Table 2. First, the annual rate of economic growth in
real terms ranges from 3% for Zimbabwe to 8% for China, with the cross-country sample
mean of 3.1%. Countries like Ireland (7%) and Russia (7%) had a relatively high growth
rate over our sample period, whereas Venezuela, Argentina, and Zimbabwe experienced
either negative or near-zero growth. The ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP, on the other
hand, ranges from practically zero for Zimbabwe to 4.66% for Israel, with an international
mean of 1.34%. Apart from Israel, countries like Sweden, Finland and Japan spend heav-
ily on R&D, each spending more than 3% of GDP. In contrast, countries like Sri Lanka,
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Table 2
The data
Country Legal
origin
Anti-
director
rights
Rule
of law
Financial
disclosure
Corruption Country
risk
Enforcement
of insider
trading law
Ownership
concentration
(OWN)
GDP
growth
RD/
GDP
(%)
Capital
expenditure/
GDP(%)
Trade
openness
Capital
market
openness
Trans-
nationality
Cross-
listings
Leverage Corporate
income tax
rate (%)
Argentina French 4 5.95 5.09 2.97 40.19 1 0.53 0.00 0.43 1.57 0.26 7.14 14.24 0.14 0.53 35.0
Australia English 4 10.00 6.18 8.62 89.64 1 0.28 0.03 1.54 4.13 0.33 7.14 17.45 0.02 0.52 31.7
Austria German 2 10.00 5.94 7.88 92.63 0 0.58 0.02 2.03 1.76 0.75 8.57 12.65 0.03 0.67 34.0
Belgium French 0 8.33 5.76 6.70 91.53 1 0.54 0.02 2.10 3.44 1.60 7.14 74.93 0.01 0.64 38.0
Brazil French 3 3.15 5.09 3.97 47.35 1 0.57 0.02 0.96 3.35 0.23 1.43 15.64 0.09 0.54 15.0
Canada English 5 10.00 6.16 8.92 90.80 1 0.40 0.03 1.92 7.53 0.67 9.29 18.87 0.23 0.57 35.2
Chile French 5 8.33 6.01 7.35 65.59 1 0.45 0.03 0.53 5.72 0.53 0.00 26.47 0.08 0.46 15.7
China Socialist n.a. 7.57 3.71 3.38 59.37 0 n.a. 0.08 1.03 2.70 0.50 0.71 14.84 0.01 0.46 30.0
Colombia French 3 1.99 4.85 3.50 48.43 0 0.63 0.02 0.16 0.63 0.30 1.43 14.88 0.02 0.33 35.9
Czech Republic Socialist 2 8.33 4.29 4.10 64.75 1 n.a. 0.03 1.21 2.41 1.10 4.29 21.55 0.01 0.42 31.8
Denmark Scand. 2 10.00 6.00 9.63 94.50 1 0.45 0.02 2.37 2.79 0.60 9.29 22.60 0.02 0.53 30.7
Egypt French 2 6.67 4.65 3.32 51.69 0 0.62 0.04 0.19 1.01 0.21 7.86 10.86 0.00 0.60 40.0
Finland Scand. 3 10.00 6.42 9.80 92.59 1 0.37 0.03 3.37 6.11 0.61 7.86 15.85 0.04 0.55 28.8
France French 3 8.10 5.74 6.72 91.98 1 0.34 0.02 2.21 5.72 0.47 7.14 11.60 0.04 0.69 33.3
Germany German 1 8.80 5.61 7.70 91.99 1 0.45 0.01 2.49 5.10 0.56 8.57 14.30 0.03 0.73 29.4
Hong Kong English 5 7.92 5.19 7.92 80.21 1 0.54 0.05 0.53 13.36 2.66 10.00 101.19 0.01 0.42 16.5
Hungary Socialist 3 7.31 4.95 5.03 68.10 1 n.a. 0.04 0.86 2.65 1.16 1.43 30.14 0.02 0.44 17.7
India English 5 6.67 4.93 2.78 54.50 1 0.40 0.06 0.81 1.95 0.21 0.00 3.19 0.00 0.58 35.4
Indonesia French 2 3.52 3.87 1.85 38.13 1 0.58 0.04 0.16 1.41 0.49 3.57 13.85 0.01 0.59 30.0
Ireland English 4 10.00 5.38 7.38 91.72 0 0.39 0.07 1.16 1.99 1.15 8.57 62.79 0.21 0.59 20.1
Israel English 3 8.33 5.42 6.95 69.95 1 0.51 0.02 4.66 2.74 0.61 0.71 14.78 0.15 0.66 36.0
Italy French 1 8.02 5.17 5.02 87.47 1 0.58 0.01 1.07 3.37 0.42 9.29 4.53 0.05 0.70 35.5
Japan German 4 8.63 5.25 6.75 90.45 1 0.18 0.01 3.04 5.62 0.19 7.86 3.59 0.01 0.67 30.0
Korea German 2 7.11 4.73 4.22 66.66 1 0.23 0.06 2.44 7.87 0.62 1.43 4.10 0.01 0.63 27.5
Luxembourg French n.a. 10.00 5.56 8.70 99.31 0 n.a. 0.04 1.71 14.23 1.08 10.00 74.93 0.17 0.56 27.3
Malaysia English 4 5.28 5.21 5.00 61.27 1 0.54 0.05 0.59 7.90 1.89 1.43 28.66 0.00 0.53 28.0
Mexico French 1 3.59 5.34 3.53 60.18 0 0.64 0.03 0.40 1.96 0.56 4.29 12.77 0.19 0.54 34.5
Netherlands French 2 10.00 5.80 8.88 93.25 1 0.39 0.02 1.94 5.99 1.13 10.00 30.36 0.18 0.62 34.8
New Zealand English 4 10.00 6.12 9.47 86.37 0 0.48 0.04 1.08 2.66 0.48 8.57 25.75 0.03 0.53 33.0
Norway Scand. 4 10.00 5.96 8.80 96.46 1 0.36 0.02 1.64 4.88 0.52 8.57 12.53 0.04 0.62 28.0
Pakistan English 5 5.00 n.a. 2.34 34.72 0 0.37 0.04 0.16 1.23 0.29 n.a. 10.21 0.00 0.60 44.4
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Peru French 3 5.00 5.03 4.03 44.83 1 0.56 0.03 0.10 1.20 0.28 10.00 11.13 0.01 0.46 29.0
Philippines French 3 4.19 4.83 2.83 51.82 0 0.57 0.04 0.20 2.75 0.96 2.14 9.21 0.02 0.57 32.2
Poland Socialist 3 6.83 5.20 3.92 63.45 1 n.a. 0.03 0.65 1.36 0.52 1.43 12.49 0.00 0.52 27.3
Portugal French 3 8.33 5.33 6.43 84.24 0 0.52 0.02 0.83 3.57 0.56 8.57 12.80 0.05 0.66 30.5
Russian Fed. Socialist 3 5.67 3.59 2.50 40.97 0 n.a. 0.07 1.12 2.64 0.52 0.71 4.59 0.02 0.32 29.5
Singapore English 4 9.49 5.63 9.23 89.83 1 0.49 0.05 2.03 8.27 2.91 7.86 54.58 0.02 0.49 24.0
Slovakia Socialist 3 7.11 3.88 3.72 56.38 0 n.a. 0.04 0.63 0.45 1.27 2.14 15.23 0.00 0.43 30.7
South Africa English 5 3.34 5.52 4.77 58.06 0 0.52 0.03 0.69 5.41 0.47 0.71 20.97 0.01 0.49 30.0
Spain French 4 7.11 5.77 6.95 87.72 1 0.51 0.03 0.95 3.81 0.44 5.71 18.54 0.00 0.64 35.0
Sri Lanka English 3 5.00 n.a. 3.53 41.27 1 0.60 0.04 0.00 0.48 0.69 n.a. 10.13 0.00 0.50 33.3
Sweden Scand. 3 10.00 6.31 9.27 92.79 1 0.28 0.03 3.96 4.28 0.63 7.86 24.90 0.04 0.58 28.0
Switzerland German 2 9.12 5.35 8.72 97.76 1 0.41 0.01 2.57 5.30 0.64 9.29 18.47 0.05 0.57 16.3
Taiwan German 3 6.78 5.40 5.65 81.19 1 0.18 0.02 1.80 8.89 0.89 n.a. 8.35 0.01 0.46 25.0
Thailand English 2 7.07 4.65 3.28 58.27 1 0.47 0.05 0.24 2.52 1.06 2.86 11.62 0.00 0.64 30.0
UK English 5 9.94 6.26 8.60 92.65 1 0.19 0.03 1.86 6.76 0.41 9.29 15.08 0.05 0.54 30.2
US English 5 9.33 6.41 7.60 95.26 1 0.20 0.03 2.69 5.76 0.19 7.86 7.42 1.00 0.65 35.0
Venezuela French 1 4.73 4.12 2.55 40.21 0 0.20 0.00 0.38 0.47 0.40 7.86 14.82 0.05 0.32 34.0
Zimbabwe English 3 2.87 5.22 2.88 26.21 0 0.55 0.03 0.00 1.28 0.58 0.00 7.58 0.01 0.45 32.5
Mean 3.07 7.36 5.30 5.83 71.32 0.67 0.44 0.03 1.34 4.06 0.73 5.61 20.77 0.07 0.55 30.11
(Median) (3.00) (7.92) (5.34) (5.65) (69.95) (1.00) (0.48) (0.03) (1.07) (3.35) (0.56) (7.14) (14.82) (0.02) (0.55) (30.50)
Standard deviation 1.28 2.33 0.72 2.48 21.37 0.47 0.14 0.02 1.08 3.05 0.56 3.58 19.86 0.15 0.10 6.25
The table reports the time-series average of the data used in the cross-sectional analyses, over the sample period 1999–2004. Legal origin denotes the origin of each country’s company law or commercial
code. They are classiﬁed into ﬁve categories: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law and former socialist origin. The anti-director rights variable is an index of
shareholder rights; the index value ranges from 0 to six, with higher values for better protection of shareholders’ rights under a country’s written law. The rule of law variable assesses the quality of law
enforcement in a given country. The ﬁnancial disclosure variable is constructed based on responses to a survey question that investigates the level of ﬁnancial disclosure required in a given country; the
score ranges from 1 to 7, with higher scores for more transparent ﬁnancial disclosures. The corruption index is a measure of perceptions of the degree of corruption in a given country. Country risk score is
taken from the September issues of Euromoney. Enforcement of insider trading law is a dummy variable of 0 or 1; a value of 1 indicates that the insider trading law exists and has ever been executed and 0
otherwise. The cash ﬂow ownership concentration variable (OWN) denotes the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-ﬁnancial, privately
owned domestic ﬁrms in a given country. GDP growth denotes the annual real GDP growth rate. R&D/GDP denotes a country’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Capital expenditure/GDP
denotes the aggregate annual capital expenditure of ﬁrms in a country as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Trade openness is calculated as the ratio of a country’s annual import plus export to GDP.
The capital market openness variable is an index measuring the openness of a country’s capital market; it scales from 0 to 10, with higher scores for more open capital markets. Trans-nationality index
measures the degree of trans-nationality of a country’s economic activities; it scales from 0 to 100. The cross-listings variable denotes the number of a country’s cross-listed stocks in the US as a percentage
of the total number of listed stocks in the domestic market. Leverage is the ratio of the aggregate book value of debts to that of assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. Corporate
income tax rate is the maximum (marginal) corporate income tax rate for each country.
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Peru, Colombia and Pakistan spend less than 0.17% of GDP on R&D eﬀorts, restricting
their growth potentials. Similarly, the ratio of capital expenditures to GDP also shows
substantial cross-country diﬀerences. For example, the ratio is less than 1% for Slovakia,
Venezuela, Sri Lanka and Colombia. But it is 14% for Luxembourg, 13% for Hong Kong
and 9% for Taiwan. The disparate capital expenditures ratio signals rather divergent
growth options among countries.
Table 2 also shows that countries like Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
have fully open capital markets, whereas many emerging economies like India, Chile and
Zimbabwe maintain signiﬁcant restrictions on capital markets. Trade openness, which is
measured by the ratio of imports and exports to GDP, ranges from 0.19 for Japan and
USA to 2.91 for Singapore. Table 2 also provides another measure of economic openness
– trans-nationality index, complied by the United Nations, representing a country’s open-
ness to foreign direct investments (FDI). Countries that are welcoming FDI inﬂows may
beneﬁt from technology transfer, more eﬃcient management, higher productivities, etc.
The trans-nationality index ranges from 3.19 for India to 101.19 for Hong Kong, with
a sample mean of 20.8. The cross-listings variable, denoting the percentage of a country’s
domestically listed ﬁrms that are cross-listed in the US, ranges from 23% for Canada, 21%
for Ireland and 19% for Mexico to nearly 0 for Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Zimbabwe.5
The leverage ratio, which is the ratio of the book value of debts to that of assets, ranges
from 0.32 for Venezuela and Russia to 0.73 for Germany. Apart from Germany, countries
like Italy, France, Japan, and Austria also have relatively high leverage ratios, reﬂecting
the historically important role that the banking sector has played in these countries. Table
2 also shows that the maximum (marginal) corporate income tax rate ranges from 15% for
Brazil to 44.4% for Pakistan, with the cross-country mean of 30%.
The rest of Table 2 provides the data related to corporate governance variables, such as
anti-director rights, rule of law, ﬁnancial disclosure, corruption, country risk, enforcement
of insider trading law, and ownership concentration measures. As is well known in the lit-
erature, common law countries tend to have stronger anti-director rights than civil law
countries. Table 2 shows that developed (developing) countries tend to have high (low) lev-
els of the rule of law, ﬁnancial disclosure, and enforcement of insider trading law, and low
(high) levels of corruption and country risk. Consistent with the corporate governance lit-
erature, corporate ownership is more concentrated (diﬀused) in the countries where share-
holder rights are weak (strong). For instance, the three largest investors of each company
control, on average, 19% of common shares outstanding in the UK, 20% in the US, but
64% in Mexico and 63% in Colombia.
5 Lang et al. (2003) show that international trading of stocks via cross-listings improves the ﬁrms’ information
environment and thereby enhances their corporate valuation. Doidge et al. (2004) further argue that besides
enjoying a greater access to foreign capital markets and a broader shareholder base, ﬁrms cross-listed in the US
receive a higher valuation on their growth opportunities. That is because ﬁrms cross-listed in the US are the ﬁrms
that have a relatively low controlling shareholder agency costs and are better able to take advantage of their
growth opportunities. To account for the eﬀect of cross-listings, we include the cross-listings variable in our
regression analysis.
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4.2. Regression results
In Section 2, we documented a wide variation in the country-level aggregate Tobin’s q
(CTQ). We now perform a series of regression analyses to answer the following question:
What drives the cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation? We ﬁrst examine the
eﬀects of (i) corporate governance, (ii) growth options, and (iii) economic openness and
tax regime separately and then examine their combined eﬀects on corporate valuation.
Our empirical results are reported in Tables 3–6. Following the methodology used by
LLSV (2002), we run random-eﬀects regressions allowing for country-speciﬁc random
eﬀects. This helps to alleviate the concern about the possibly omitted variables at the coun-
try level.6
4.2.1. Eﬀects of corporate governance
We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects of corporate governance in Table 3. The variables consid-
ered here are inspired by the recent literature on corporate governance and include anti-
director rights, rule of law, legal family, ﬁnancial disclosure, degree of corruption, country
risk, insider trading law enforcement, and corporate ownership structure. Panel B of Table
3 provides the correlation among these variables. Anti-director rights measure the share-
holder rights speciﬁed by the law. As documented in LLSV (1998), English common law
countries tend to provide shareholders with stronger protection than countries with civil
law traditions and thus score higher on the anti-director rights measure. For this reason,
the anti-director rights and the legal family (English common law) variables have a high
positive correlation, 0.58. Interestingly, both anti-director rights and English common
law have less signiﬁcant correlations with the rule of law variable which measures the qual-
ity of law enforcement. The rule of law variable, on the other hand, is highly positively
correlated with such variables as ﬁnancial disclosure (0.66), corruption (0.83), and country
risk (0.85). As can be expected, better quality of law enforcement is associated with more
transparent accounting, less corruption, and lower country risk. The enforcement of insi-
der trading variable is substantially correlated with the rule of law (0.35), ﬁnancial disclo-
sure (0.24), corruption (0.32), and country risk (0.33) variables, but not with the legal
family (0.02) variable. It is noteworthy that the ownership concentration variable is neg-
atively correlated with all the corporate governance variables.
Regression results involving various governance variables are presented in Panel A of
Table 3. We ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of anti-director rights and the rule of law. In Model
(1), the coeﬃcient for anti-director rights is positive as expected and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, whereas that for the rule of law is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Similarly, Model (2) shows that English common law has a positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient at the 5% level, whereas the rule of law remains positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. In Models (3) through (5), we examine the eﬀects of ﬁnancial disclosure, corruption,
and country risk. All three variables have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on CTQ. In other
words, more transparent accounting, less corruption, and lower country risk all contribute
6 We conducted a Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrangian multiplier test on the null hypothesis of a classical
regression speciﬁcation against the alternative of a random-eﬀects speciﬁcation. The test strongly rejects the null.
A ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation is not feasible in our setup as some of our explanatory variables do not have within-
country variation.
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Table 3
Corporate governance and country Tobin’s q
Dependent variable: Country Tobin’s q
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Regression analysis
Intercept 0.726 0.808 0.275 0.875 0.648 1.114 0.692 0.744
(8.032) (10.248) (1.693) (11.085) (7.160) (14.642) (7.483) (4.152)
Anti-director 0.033 0.015 0.014 0.040 0.041 0.031 0.059
(2.056) (0.917) (0.884) (2.635) (2.415) (1.921) (2.282)
Rule of law 0.069 0.072 0.063 0.066
(8.325) (8.547) (7.125) (6.841)
English common law 0.094
(2.143)
Financial disclosure 0.318
(10.373)
Corruption index 0.078
(9.528)
Country risk 0.009
(9.720)
Enforcement of
insider trading law
0.218 0.109 0.050
(4.588) (2.329) (1.008)
OWN*H_ Anti 0.371
(1.762)
OWN*L_ Anti 0.025
(0.129)
Overall R2 (%) 24.93 20.51 31.09 30.26 28.75 15.28 28.72 32.47
N 282.00 294.00 270.00 278.00 282.00 282.00 282.00 252.00
Variable Anti-
director
Rule of
law
English
common law
Financial
disclosure
Corruption
index
Country
risk
Enforcement
of Insider
trading law
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for corporate governace variables
Rule of law 0.14b
English common law 0.58a 0.12c
Financial disclosure 0.35a 0.66a 0.18a
Corruption index 0.24a 0.83a 0.14b 0.85a
Country risk 0.08 0.85a 0.02 0.74a 0.88a
Enforcement of
Insider trading law
0.13b 0.35a 0.02 0.24a 0.32a 0.33a
OWN 0.24a 0.44a 0.09 0.31a 0.35a 0.42a 0.35a
The table estimates the eﬀects of corporate governance on the country Tobin’s q. The results are based on
random-eﬀects regressions for the sample of 49 countries, over years 1999–2004. The dependent variable is the
country Tobin’s q. The country Tobin’s q is estimated as the ratio of aggregate market value to book value of
assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. For brevity, readers are referred to Table 2 for
deﬁnitions of the anti-director rights, rule of law, ﬁnancial disclosure, corruption index, country risk, enforcement
of insider trading law, and cash ﬂow ownership concentration (OWN) variables. H_Anti (L_Anti) is a dummy
variable of 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that the country’s anti-director right is greater (equal to or less) than the
median of the 49 countries we study, and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Overall R2 and the
number of countries (N) used in each regression equation are reported at the bottom of the table. Panel B reports
the Pearson correlations among the independent variables, where the superscripts a, b, and c denote the 1%, 5%,
and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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signiﬁcantly to corporate valuation. However, due to the high correlations of these vari-
ables with the rule of law, we will consider just the rule of law in the ensuing analyses.
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document that a country’s enforcement of insider trad-
ing law reduces its aggregate cost of capital. Model (6) shows that it indeed has a signif-
icantly positive eﬀect on corporate valuation. Model (7) shows that even after considering
the eﬀect of the rule of law, the enforcement of insider trading law remains statistically sig-
niﬁcant, albeit at a lower level. In Model (8), we consider the eﬀect of corporate ownership
structure in addition to the eﬀects of anti-director rights, rule of law, and the enforcement
of insider trading laws. Since ownership concentration may have diﬀerent eﬀect on valu-
ation, depending on whether or not shareholder rights are well protected, we consider
the cross-product terms. Model (8) shows that the coeﬃcient is negative (and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level) for OWN*H_Anti (implying that owner concentration is detrimental
to corporate valuation when shareholder rights are strong) and insigniﬁcant for OWN*-
L_Anti. Both the rule of law and anti-director rights retain their signiﬁcance but the
enforcement of insider trading law loses its signiﬁcance once we control for the eﬀects
of corporate ownership.
Table 4
Growth options and country Tobin’s q
Independent variable Dependent variable: Country Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Regression analysis
Intercept 1.362 1.224 1.274 1.158 1.115
(25.291) (23.233) (23.356) (20.534) (19.322)
GDP growth 1.681 2.051 1.833
(2.303) (3.074) (2.768)
R&D/JGDP 0.146 0.151 0.130
(7.440) (7.748) (6.338)
CE/GDP 0.036 0.020
(5.333) (3.001)
Overall R2 (%) 13.21 23.02 14.80 25.99 29.32
N 294.00 294.00 294.00 294.00 294.00
Variable GDP growth RD/GDP CE/GDP
Panel B: Correlations among independent variables
GDP growth 1.00
R&D/GDP 0.07 1.00
CE/GDP 0.08 0.34a 1.00
Panel A of the table estimates the eﬀects of growth options on the country Tobin’s q. The results are based on
random-eﬀects regressions for the sample of 49 countries, over years 1999–2004. The dependent variable is the
country Tobin’s q. The independent variables include GDP growth, R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
(R&D/GDP), and capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP (CE/GDP). The country Tobin’s q is estimated as
the ratio of aggregate market value to book value of assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country.
GDP growth denotes the average annual real GDP growth rate. R&D/GDP denotes a country’s R&D expen-
diture as a percentage of GDP. CE/GDP denotes the aggregate annual capital expenditure of ﬁrms in a country as
a percentage of the country’s GDP. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Overall R2 and the number of
countries (N) used in each regression equation are reported at the bottom of the panel. Panel B reports the
Pearson correlations among the independent variables, where the superscripts a, b, and c denote the 1%, 5%, and
10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Economic openness, tax regime, and country Tobin’s q
Independent variable Dependent variable: Country Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Regression analysis
Intercept 1.415 1.210 1.308 1.369 1.111 1.227 1.224 0.968
(24.905) (20.094) (24.095) (27.866) (18.898) (13.381) (5.160) (9.777)
Trade openness 0.006
(0.141)
Capital market openness 0.039 0.035 0.032
(6.190) (5.540) (4.669)
Transnationality 0.004 0.002 0.003
(3.298) (1.905) (2.568)
Cross-listing 0.653 0.519 0.498
(4.366) (3.705) (3.560)
Tax shield 1.059 0.835
(2.461) (1.808)
Corporate tax advantage 0.295
(0.859)
Overall R2(%) 0.84 14.18 7.68 5.48 22.28 2.10 0.15 25.10
N 294.00 276.00 285.00 294.00 269.00 289.00 289.00 266.00
Variable Trade
openness
Capital
market
openness
Trans-
nationality
Cross-
listing
Tax shield Corporate tax
advantage
Panel B: Correlations among independent variables
Trade openness 1.00
Capital market openness 0.08 1.00
Transnationality 0.73a 0.29a 1.00
Cross-listing 0.15b 0.18a 0.03 1.00
Tax shield 0.28a 0.25a 0.32a 0.20a 1.00
Corporate tax advantage 0.32a 0.09 0.37a 0.12b 0.80a 1.00
Panel A of the table estimates the eﬀects of capital market openness, tax shield, and corporate tax advantage on
the country Tobin’s q. The results are based on random-eﬀects regressions for the sample of 49 countries, over
years 1999–2004. The dependent variable is the country Tobin’s q. The country Tobin’s q is estimated as the ratio
of aggregate market value to book value of assets held by all sample public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. Trade
openness is calculated as the ratio of a country’s annual import plus export to GDP. The capital market openness
variable is an index measuring the openness of a country’s capital market; it scales from 0 to 10, with higher
scores for more open capital markets. Trans-nationality index measures the degree of trans-nationality of a
country’s economic activities; it scales from 0 to 100. The cross-listings variable denotes the number of a country’s
cross-listed stocks in the US as a percentage of the total number of listed stocks in the domestic market. A
country’s tax shield is proxied by the cross-product of the leverage ratio and the marginal corporate income tax
rate in the country. Leverage is the ratio of the aggregate book value of debts to that of assets held by all sample
public ﬁrms domiciled in a country. Corporate tax advantage is proxied by 1 minus the marginal corporate
income tax rate in the country. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Overall R2 and the number of countries
(N) used in each regression equation are reported at the bottom of the panel. Panel B reports the Pearson
correlations among the independent variables, where the superscripts a, b, and c denote the 1%, 5%, and 10%
signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
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Table 6
Determinants of country Tobin’s q: combined eﬀects
Independent variable Dependent variable: Country Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.744 0.676 0.429 0.507 0.513
(4.152) (3.729) (2.179) (2.878) (2.749)
Anti-director 0.059 0.052 0.075 0.062 0.060
(2.282) (2.023) (2.817) (2.300) (2.193)
Rule of law 0.066 0.050 0.039 0.024 0.022
(6.841) (4.456) (2.733) (1.766) (1.656)
Enforcement of insider trading law 0.050 0.009 0.073 0.088 0.105
(1.008) (0.162) (1.296) (1.677) (2.014)
OWN*H_Anti 0.371 0.152 0.059 0.119 0.130
(1.762) (0.654) (0.235) (0.472) (0.490)
OWN*L_Anti 0.025 0.121 0.414 0.349 0.327
(0.129) (0.608) (1.906) (1.726) (1.573)
GDP growth 1.896 2.166 2.530 2.531
(2.883) (3.221) (4.050) (4.001)
R&D/GDP 0.067 0.072 0.088 0.093
(2.426) (2.481) (3.238) (3.439)
CE/GDP 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.392) (0.433) (0.516) (0.631)
Capital market openness 0.016 0.024 0.024
(1.857) (2.925) (2.929)
Transnationality 0.000 0.000
(0.031) (0.071)
Cross-listing 0.224 0.226
(1.751) (1.743)
Tax shield 0.002
(0.003)
Inﬂation 0.038
(0.670)
Overall R2 (%) 32.47 37.15 41.39 45.92 47.07
N 252.00 252.00 234.00 230.00 229.00
The table estimates the determinants of country Tobin’s q. The results are based on random-eﬀects regressions for
the sample of 49 countries, over years 1999–2004. The dependent variable is the country Tobin’s q. The country
Tobin’s q is estimated as the ratio of aggregate market value to book value of assets held by all sample public
ﬁrms domiciled in a country. The anti-director rights variable is an index of shareholder rights; its value ranges
from 0 to six, with higher values for better protection of shareholders’ rights under a country’s written law. The
rule of law variable assesses the quality of law enforcement in a given country. Enforcement of insider trading law
is a dummy variable of 0 or 1; a value of 1 indicates that the insider trading law exists and has ever been executed
and 0 otherwise. The cash ﬂow ownership concentration variable (OWN) denotes the average percentage of
common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-ﬁnancial, privately owned domestic
ﬁrms in a given country. H_Anti (L_Anti) is a dummy variable of 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that the country’s anti-
director right is greater (equal to or less) than the median of the 49 countries we study, and 0 otherwise. GDP
growth denotes the annual real GDP growth. R&D/GDP denotes a country’s R&D expenditure as a percentage
of GDP. CE/GDP denotes the aggregate annual capital expenditure of ﬁrms in a country as a percentage of the
country’s GDP. The capital market openness variable is an index measuring the openness of a country’s capital
market; it scales from 0 to 10, with higher scores for more open capital markets. Trans-nationality index measures
the degree of trans-nationality of a country’s economic activities; it scales from 0 to 100. The cross-listings
variable denotes the number of a country’s cross-listed stocks in the US as a percentage of the total number of
listed stocks in the domestic market. A country’s tax shield is proxied by the cross-product of the leverage ratio
and the marginal corporate income tax rate in the country. The inﬂation rate is measured annually. Numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics. Overall R2 and the number of countries (N) used in each regression equation are
reported at the bottom of the table.
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4.2.2. Eﬀects of growth options
In Table 4, we investigate the relationship between growth options and CTQ. Since it is
diﬃcult to measure growth options directly, we use three diﬀerent proxies: real GDP
growth, the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP, and the ratio of capital expenditures to
GDP. Although none of the proxies may be perfect, each of them is likely to capture at
least a part of the growth options faced by a country. In particular, recent GDP growth
in a country may well predict short-term future growth. On the other hand, capital expen-
ditures and R&D expenditures may signal long-term growth potentials. We expect the
GDP growth rate, the R&D/GDP ratio and the CE/GDP ratio to all have a positive rela-
tionship with CTQ.
Panel A of Table 4 presents the regression results. Tested separately, each of the three
proxies has a signiﬁcant relationship with CTQ. The regression coeﬃcient for the GDP
growth rate is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level while the coeﬃcients for both
R&D/GDP ratio and CE/GDP ratio are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
R&D variable has the highest R2 value, 23%, among the three proxies for growth options.7
Multivariate regression analyses in Models (4) and (5) show that all three variables remain
signiﬁcant. The R2 fromModel (5) shows that the three proxy variables for growth options
can collectively explain nearly a third (29%) of the cross-country variations in CTQ.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the correlation among the three proxy variables for growth
options. The panel shows that the GDP growth rate has insigniﬁcant correlations with
both the R&D/GDP and CE/GDP ratios. However, the CE/GDP ratio has a signiﬁcant
and positive correlation, 0.34, with the R&D/GDP ratio.
4.2.3. Eﬀects of economic openness and tax regime
In Table 5, we investigate the eﬀects of economic openness and tax regime on CTQ.
Models (1)–(4) show that trade openness has insigniﬁcant eﬀects on CTQ, but capital mar-
ket openness, trans-nationality and cross-listings have signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects on
CTQ. Model (5) shows that when capital market openness, trans-nationality and cross-list-
ings are considered at the same time, capital market openness and cross-listings variables
remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and trans-nationality is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These
results are consistent with the argument that capital market liberalization leads to lower
costs of capital and boosts corporate valuation. We ﬁnd that the capital market openness
variable alone can explain about 14% of the cross-country variations in CTQ. Furthermore,
the three variables of Model (5) can collectively explain 22% of the variations in CTQ.
Models (6)–(7) show that the tax shields variable is signiﬁcant with the expected sign,
but the tax advantage variable is insigniﬁcant. This could be due to the possibility that
the complex web of tax codes and shelters used by ﬁrms may render the valuation eﬀect
diﬃcult to detect. Model (8) shows that when CTQ is regressed on capital market open-
ness, trans-nationality, cross-listings and tax shields variables, the ﬁrst three variables
remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better, and the tax shield is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the correlations among the ﬁve independent variables. Not
surprising, corporate tax advantage is found to have a very high negative correlation with
tax shield, 0.80. Also, the corporate tax advantage variable has positive and signiﬁcant
correlations with both the trade openness and trans-nationality variables. This may sug-
7 We recognize that R2 in a random-eﬀects model is not identical to R2 in an OLS regression setting.
Nevertheless, the intuition and interpretation of this quantity remain largely unchanged.
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gest that an open economy and the associated international competition drive down cor-
porate income tax rates.
4.2.4. Combined eﬀects
We now examine the combined eﬀects of corporate governance, growth options, capital
market openness, and tax shields on corporate valuation. In Table 6, we start out with
Model (1) which only considers corporate governance-related variables that we have
already discussed. In Model (2), we add the three proxy variables for growth options to
the governance-related variables. When the two sets of variables are considered together,
anti-director rights, rule of law, GDP growth and R&D/GDP variables are signiﬁcant
with the expected signs, but CE/GDP ratio is insigniﬁcant.
In Models (3) and (4), we add the capital market openness variable as well as trans-
nationality and cross-listings to our analysis. As can be seen from the results of Models
(3) and (4), open capital markets have a positive eﬀect on corporate valuation, indepen-
dently of corporate governance and growth options. As a result of adding capital market
openness (and the other two openness variables), the rule of law becomes less signiﬁcant.
This can be attributable to a relatively high positive correlation, 0.59, between the two
variables. A high correlation between capital market openness and the rule of law, an
interesting fact on its own right, means that a strong tradition of law and order is condu-
cive for open capital markets.
In Model (5), we additionally consider the eﬀect of tax shield and inﬂation. Tax shield is
found to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate valuation in the context of the model.
Model (5), our most comprehensive model, shows that the GDP growth, R&D intensity,
capital market openness, cross-listings, anti-director rights, rule of law and enforcement of
insider trading law have signiﬁcant, positive eﬀects on corporate valuation. In addition,
concentrated ownership has a positive eﬀect on corporate valuation when shareholder
rights are weak, which is consistent with the LLSV ﬁnding. Further, the results in Model
(5) show that our key ﬁndings remain robust to the inclusion of inﬂation.8 In conclusion,
growth options, capital market openness and shareholder rights can signiﬁcantly explain
cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation.9
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we document that corporate valuation, as measured by the country-level
aggregate Tobin’s q, varies greatly across countries. Speciﬁcally, country Tobin’s q, which
8 Inﬂation could systematically distort our measure of country Tobin’s q. For example, if a ﬁrm keeps historical
value of assets in its book and/or use LIFO to account for inventory, the book value could be understated
compared to the actual replacement cost as a result of inﬂation. In such cases, an upward bias would be present in
our measure of country Tobin’s q. To mitigate this potential bias, we control for inﬂation in our regression
models.
9 To further examine the robustness of our results, we check if our ﬁndings may be aﬀected by cross-country
diﬀerences in industrial structure. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst classify individual ﬁrms into nine major industry groups
based on their two-digit SIC codes and calculate Tobin’s q for each industry. We then compute the industry-
adjusted CTQ as the diﬀerence between the country’s CTQ and the value-weighted industry Tobin’s q for each
country. The industry-adjusted CTQ, ranging from 0.68 for Columbia and Slovakia to 0.55 for Finland, is
found to be highly correlated with the unadjusted CTQ. The regression results with the industry-adjusted CTQ
remain essentially unaltered from those reported in Table 6. Details are available upon request.
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is equivalent to the Tobin’s q for the market portfolio of a country, ranges from 0.73 for
Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland during our sample period. We then showed that the cross-
country variations in corporate valuation are driven not only by corporate governance
factors, such as shareholder rights, the rule of law, and ownership structure, but also by
economic growth options, represented by the R&D intensity and capital expenditure to
GDP ratio, and the degree of capital market openness. Our regression analyses indicate
that diﬀerential growth options faced by countries can explain nearly a third of the
observed cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation, conﬁrming the forward-looking
nature of corporate valuation. We also ﬁnd that the degree of capital market openness
alone can explain about 14% of the cross-country diﬀerences in corporate valuation. This
ﬁnding suggests that liberalized capital markets lead to lower costs of capital and more
proﬁtable investments, thereby enhancing corporate valuation. An immediate implication
of this ﬁnding is that various restrictions on international capital ﬂows existing in many
developing countries are imposed at the cost of reduced corporate valuation.
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